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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT-PERPETUATING THE TEN­
SION? Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The first amendment states that "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer­
cise thereof ...."1 To the framers of the Constitution, these two 
religious clauses "were at least compatible and at best mutually sup­
portive."2 With the application of the religious clauses to the states3 
and an expanding definition of religion,4 a serious tension developed 
in this once harmonious relationship.s As a consequence, the Court 
attempted to alleviate the tension by following a neutral course be­
tween the two clauses.6 The perpetual tension between the free exer­
cise clause and the establishment clause was illustrated again in the 
recent Supreme Court decision of Thomas v. Review Board.7 
In Thomas, the Court decided the issue of whether Indiana's 
denial of unemployment compensation benefits to a Jehovah's Wit-
I. U.S. CONST. art. I. 
2. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 814 (l978) [hereinafter cited as 
TRIBE). 
3. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. I (1947) (Court first applied the estab­
lishment clause to the states); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Court first 
applied the free exercise clause to the states). 
4. The Supreme Court appears to have moved toward a twofold definition of reli­
gion. The Court's definition of "religion" under the establishment clause seems narrower 
than the definition applied to the free exercise clause. TRIBE, supra note I, at 829. See 
also Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (holding that religion could not be 
limited to religions based on the belief in God); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 
(1944) (holding that truth or veracity of one's religious beliefs could not be considered by 
judge or jury without violating the free exercise clause); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 
U.S. 67, 69-70 (I 953} ("it is no business of courts to say that what is a religious practice or 
activity for one group is not religion under the protection of the First Amendment"). 
5. See Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, And Doctrinal Development: 
Pari I. The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1388-90 (l967). See 
also TRIBE supra note I, at 815. 
6. See Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970). The Court stated 
that it has struggled "to find a neutral course between the two Religious Clauses, both of 
which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, 
would tend to clash with the other." See also TRIBE, supra note 2, at 816-19; Gianella, 
Religious Liberty, Nones/ablishmen/, And Doc/rinal Developmen/: Par/II. The Nones/ab­
lishmen/ Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 516-18 (1968). 
7. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
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ness, who had terminated his employment because his religious be­
lief forbade his participation in the production of armaments, was a 
violation of his first amendment rights to the free exercise of reli­
gion.s The Court held that the denial of unemployment compensa­
tion benefits violated Thomas' right to the free exercise of religion.9 
In a persuasive dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist asserted that 
the Court's decision only added "mud to the already muddied waters 
of the First Amendment."10 Both opinions, however, failed to re­
solve the continuing dilemma of the tension between the free exer­
cise clause and the establishment clause. This note will examine the 
question the Thomas Court failed to address: whether the tension 
between the two religious clauses can be eliminated. The note will 
also propose an analysis for resolving this tension. 
II. THOMAS 
A. Facts 
In 1974, Eddie C. Thomas began working in the roll foundary 
at the Blaw-Knox Foundary and Machinery, Inc., a plant engaged 
primarily in weapons production. I I After working nearly a year, the 
roll foundary closed whereupon the company transferred Thomas to 
a department that produced gun turrets for military tanks.12 On his 
first day at his new position, Thomas discovered that the job entailed 
weapons-related work. 13 Troubled that working on producing arma­
ments would violate his religious principles,14 Thomas requested a 
8. Id. at 709. 
9. Id. at 720. 
10. Id. Despite the framer's intent that the religious clauses be at least compatible 
and mutually supportive, a serious tension exists between the two clauses. For example, 
spending funds to employ a chaplain in the armed forces violates the establishment 
clause. At the same time, to deny a soldier the right to "pastoral guidance" prohibits the 
free exercise of his religion. School District of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 209 
(1963). See also Gianella, supra note 5, at 1388-90. 
II. Thomas v. Review Board, 271 Ind. 233, 235, 391 N.E.2d 1127, 1128 (1979), 
rev'd, 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
12. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 710. 
13. Id. Upon inquiry, Thomas discovered that all remaining jobs at the plant were 
engaged in the production of armaments. 
14. 271 Ind. at 235, 391 N.E.2d at 1128 (1979), rev'd, 450 U.S. 707 (1981). As a 
result of his wariness about working on armaments, Thomas consulted a fellow co­
worker who like himself was a Jehovah's Witness, about the situation. His co-worker 
found nothing unscriptural about producing arms, indicating that he would continue his 
employment at the plant. Id. Thomas then consulted other members of his congregation 
to see whether or not they believed that continuing work would be unscriptural. The 
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layoff after discovering that all remaining departments in the plant 
were engaged in the manufacturing of armaments. IS When the re­
quest was subsequently denied, Thomas quit l6 and applied for un­
employment compensation benefits under the Indiana Employment 
and Security Act. 17 
At the administrative hearing which ensued, the hearing referee 
concluded that although Thomas had terminated his employment 
due to his religious beliefs, he was not entitled to collect unemploy­
ment compensation benefits because he had terminated his employ­
ment without "good cause in connection with [his] work," as 
required by the Indiana statute. IS The Review Board adopted the 
referee's findings and denied Thomas unemployment compensation 
benefits. 19 
On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals considered whether 
the disqualifying provision of the Indiana Employment Security Act 
violated Thomas' first amendment rights to the free exercise of reli­
gion.20 Relying upon the rationale of Sherbert v. Verner,21 the court 
of appeals found that Thomas had terminated his employment as a 
result of his religious convictions and stated that the Indiana statute 
cast "an impermissable burden on his First Amendment guarantee 
to the free exercise of his religion."22 As a result, the court held that 
record, however, never indicated whether the other members of the Jehovah's Witness 
made this decision. Id. at 236, 391 N.E.2d at 1128-29. 
15. Id. at 236, 391 N.E.2d at 1129. 
16. Id. 
17. 450 U.S. at 710 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 22-4-1-1 to 22-4-39-5 (Bums 1974 & 
Supp. 1983». 
18. Id. at 712. The hearing referee denied Thomas unemployment compensation 
benefits under the Indiana Employment Security Act which provides: ". . . an individ­
ual who has voluntarily left his employment without good cause in connection with the 
work or who was discharged from his employment for just cause shall be ineligible for 
... benefit rights ...." 450 U.S. at 709-10 n.1 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 22-4-15-I(a) 
(Bums 1974 & Supp. 1983). 
19. Id. at 712. 
20. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 381 N.E.2d 888, 890 
(1978). 
21. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (denial of unemployment compensa­
tion to Seventh Day Adventist who refused to work Saturdays which in her faith was the 
Sabbath, violated the free exercise clause). See infra note 29. 
22. 381 N.E.2d 888, 895 (1978). While the review board contended that granting 
benefits would constitute a violation of the establishment clause, the court of appeals 
held otherwise, maintaining that the contention was not supported and that the review 
board failed to disting~ish Thomas from the holding in Sherhert which the Court as­
serted was controlling. 381 N.E.2d at 891. The court of appeals acknowledged the "ten­
sion" between the two religious clauses, and despite the Court's decisions in United 
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1963) and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), 
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the statute was unconstitutional as applied to Thomas.23 
The Indiana Supreme Court vacated the orders of the appellate 
court and denied Thomas unemployment compensation benefits.24 
The court found that Thomas had terminated his employment vol­
untarily based upon his personal philosophy rather than upon a reli­
gious choice. It held, therefore, that he was not protected by the free 
exercise clause of the first amendment.25 The court concluded that 
denying Thomas unemployment compensation benefits only im­
posed an indirect burden on his free exercise rights, a burden which 
was justified by the legitimate state interest of maintaining a stable 
work force. 26 Furthermore, the court held that entitling unemploy­
ment compensation benefits to one who voluntarily terminated his 
employment "for personal reasons and personal belief which can 
somehow be described as religious beliefs," while denying benefits to 
other employees who terminated their employment for personal be­
liefs which were not religious, violated the establishment clause of 
the first amendment. 27 
Sherbert had not been modified or overruled and remained a viable precedent. 381 
N.E.2d at 893-95. 
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Buchanan explained that in protecting the 
"Free Exercise" rights of Thomas, "the court comes dangerously close to contravening 
the Establishment Clause of the same amendment." Id. at 896. The dissent contended 
"that the First Amendment pendulum has been swung by the majority out of its natural 
arc in the Free Exercise area into an unnatural area in the Establishment Area ...." Id. 
at 896. 
23. 381 N.E.2d at 895 (1978). 
24. 271 Ind. at 245, 391 N.E.2d at 1134. The Indiana Supreme Court distinguished 
Sherbert from Thomas on the basis that the Sherbert holding was limited to situations 
where the employee was fired, whereas in Thomas the employee left work voluntarily. 
Id. at 242-43, 391 N.E.2d at 1132-33. 
25. Id. at 245, 391 N.E.2d at 1134. The Indiana Supreme Court concluded that 
denying Thomas benefits did not violate his free exercise rights because Thomas was 
unclear as to just what were his religious beliefs. Furthermore, he was not required to 
violate a cardinal tenet of his religion as was the situation in Sherbert which required 
that a Sabbatarian either work on the Sabbath in violation of his religious principles or 
not work at all. Id. at 242-45, 391 N.E.2d at 1132-34. 
26. /d. at 236-39, 391 N.E.2d at 1129-31. The Court has previously determined 
that, 
[ilf the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all 
religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitu­
tionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only 
indirect. But if the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its 
power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular goals, 
the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the 
state may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden. 
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (citation omitted). 
27. 271 Ind. at 245, 391 N .E.2d at 1134. 
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The United States Supreme Court reversed the Indiana 
Supreme Court and held that the denial of unemployment compen­
sation benefits violated Thomas' first amendment right to the free 
exercise of religion.28 
III. ANALYSIS 
In addressing the issue of whether denying Thomas unemploy­
ment compensation benefits violated the free exercise clause, Chief 
Justice Burger, writing for the majority, stated that the issue must be 
examined in light of the Court's prior decisions, particularly Sherbert 
v. Verner .29 
The Court had previously determined in other cases that only 
those beliefs that were religious could be afforded protection by the 
free exercise clause of the first amendment.30 Defining religious be­
lief or practice, however, was "a most delicate question."31 In 
Thomas, the Indiana Supreme Court held that Thomas' decision to 
quit was merely a "personal philosophical rather than a religious 
choice."32 The United States Supreme Court, however, stated that 
what constituted a religious belief did not turn on the court's percep­
tion of that particular belief: a religious belief "need not be accepta­
ble, logical, consistent or comprehensible to others in order to merit 
First Amendment protection."33 
28. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
29. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist was fired from her 
job because she refused to work on Saturday, which in her faith is the Sabbath Day. 
Unable to find other employment as a result of her refusal to work Saturdays, Sherbert 
applied for unemployment benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment Compen­
sation Act. The Act provided that a claimant is ineligible for unemployment compensa­
tion benefits if that person has failed, without good cause, to accept available, suitable 
work when offered. Id. at 399-401. The United States Supreme Court held that the 
South Carolina statute violated Sherbert's right to the free exercise of her religion, and 
thus violated the first amendment. Id. at 410. 
30. Id. See a/so Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
31. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 351-61 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); 
see a/so Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 
(1944). 
32. 271 Ind. at 239, 391 N .E.2d at 1131. The Court has previously established that 
a personal ratlier than a religious choice does not constitute a claim protected by the free 
exercise clause of the first amendment. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972). 
The Indiana Supreme Court's rationale was based on the fact that Thomas was 
struggling with his beliefs and could not express them clearly. Thomas admitted to the 
referee that he would not object to working for United States Steel or Inland Steel who 
produced steel, the raw product necessary for the production of tanks, "because . . . I 
would not be a direct party to whoever they shipped it to ... [and) would not be charge­
able in ... my conscience." 271 Ind. at 241, 391 N.E.2d at 1131. 
33. 450 U.S. at 714. 
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The United States Supreme Court in Thomas, however, never 
addressed the issue of the parameters of religion. Chief Justice Bur­
ger stated that it was not the Court's role to determine whether 
Thomas' beliefs were unreasonable;34 rather, the function of the re­
viewing court was to determine whether the lower court was correct 
in finding Thomas terminated his job as a result of an "honest con­
viction" that his religious beliefs forbade the particular work.35 
Having established that Thomas' beliefs were religious, the Court 
found that the state's interests were not sufficiently compelling to 
outweigh the interests of Thomas in exercising his religious rights.36 
The Supreme Court has traditionally defined the scope of the 
free exercise clause as prohibiting restrictions on the free exercise of 
any form of religion.37 The intent of the framers of the Constitution 
in the religious clause was to build a wall of separation between 
church and state.38 The state, however, was not to be deprived of all 
power to regulate activities that fell within the guidelines of the first 
amendment.39 If the state could justify the regulation of religious 
expression as the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling 
state interest,40 the regulation would be allowed. 
In applying the balancing test, the Court found Indiana's inter­
ests were twofold: to avoid widespread unemployment and to avoid 
excessive inquiry by employers into the reglious beliefs of job appli­
cants.41 The Court in Thomas concluded that these interests were 
not sufficiently compelling to justify the burden placed upon the 
34. Id. at 715. Chief Justice Burger stated that "Thomas drew a line, and it is not 
for us to say that the line he drew was an unreasonable one. Courts should not under­
take to dissect religious beliefs because the believer admits that he is 'struggling' with his 
position or because his beliefs are not articulated with ... clarity and precision ...." 
Id. 
35. /d. at 716. 
36. Id. at 719. 
37. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 203 (1972). 
38. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878); see a/so TRIBE, supra note 
I, at 816-19. 
39. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 
U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
40. 450 U.S. at 718. The Court in Yoder stated that only those interests of the 
highest order can outweigh a legitimate claim of the free exercise of religion. 406 U.S. at 
215. 
41. 450 U.S. at 718-19. Chief Justice Burger concluded that "there was no evi­
dence in the record to indicate that the number of people who would have to choose 
between receiving benefits and exercising their religious rights "is large enough to create 
'widespread unemployment: or even to seriously affect unemployment. . . ." Further­
more, he concluded that the record did not indicate that employers will increase inquiries 
into job applicants' religious beliefs. Id. at 719. 
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right of free exercise ofreligion.42 Consequently, the Court held that 
Thomas was entitled to receive unemployment compensation bene­
fits unless, as the Review Board maintained, such payments violated 
the establishment clause.43 
The final issue raised in Thomas was whether forcing the state 
to provide unemployment compensation benefits to Thomas would 
be a fostering of religion thereby violating the establishment 
clause.44 The Court agreed that, to an extent, Thomas "gain[ed] a 
benefit from his religious beliefs, but this manifest[ed] no more than 
the tension between the two religious clauses which the Court re­
solved in Sherbert."45 
In holding as we do, plainly we are not fostering the 'establish­
ment' ofthe Seventh-day Adventist religion in South Carolina, for 
the extension of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in com­
mon with Sunday worshippers reflects nothing more than the gov­
ernmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious 
differences, and does not represent that involvement of religious 
with secular institutions which it is the object of the Establishment 
Clause to forestall.46 
The Justices in Thomas asserted that unless they were prepared to 
overrule Sherbert, Thomas could not be denied unemployment com­
pensation benefits.47 
The crux of the constitutional problem, however, is exposed in 
Justice Rehnquist's dissent.48 Justice Rehnquist stated that the ma­
jority's decision added "mud to the already muddied waters" of the 
first amendment.49 Although Rehnquist agreed with the Court's ac­
knowledgement that tension existed between the free exercise clause 
and the establishment clause of the first amendment,50 he stated that 
the Court's decision did little to resolve the tension between the 
clauses or "offer meaningful guidance to other courts which must 
decide cases like this on a day-to-day basis."51 Rehnquist believed 
that the tension was a result of improper interpretation of the reli­
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972); Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931, 934-37 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
46. 450 U.S. at 719-20. (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409). 
47. Id. at 720 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 720-21. 
51. Id. at 722. 
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gious clauses. 52 Just as did the majority in Sherbert, Rehnquist as­
serted that the Court in Thomas viewed the free exercise clause more 
broadly than was warranted. 53 He claimed that the proper interpre­
tation would follow the decision in Braunfeld v. Brown 54 and the dis­
sent in Sherbert.55 
In Braunfeld, the Court held that a Pennsylvania criminal stat­
ute which forbade the retail sale on Sunday of certain commodities 
did not violate the free exercise rights of Sabbatarians.56 Chief Jus­
tice Warren, writing for the Court, explained that the statute did not 
make unlawful any religious practice; it simply made the practice of 
the Sabbatarian's religion more expensive. 57 The Court concluded 
that "[t]o strike down, without the most critical scrutiny, legislation 
which imposes only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion, 
I:e., legislation which does not make unlawful the religious practice 
itself, would radically restrict the operating latitude of the legisla­
ture."58 In Thomas, Rehnquist noted that under the Braunfeld ra­
tionale, Indiana had not discriminated against Thomas on the basis 
of his religious belief and, therefore, the statute did not violate his 
free exercise rights.59 He further asserted that when a state had en­
acted a statute to advance secular goals, the free exercise clause did 
not require that the statute conform to the religious desires of any 
group.60 
Rehnquist also agreed with the rationale established in Justice 
Harlan's dissent in Sherbert.61 Justice Harlan had asserted that the 
majority's decision constitutionally compelled the state "to carve out 
an exception" and to provide benefits to those individuals who were 
52. Id. 
53. Id. The Court in Sherbert held that religious classifications are not only per­
missible in some instances but may be required by the free exercise clause. 374 U.S. at 
409-10. 
54. 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
55. 450 U.S. at 722 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
56. 366 U.S. at 609-10. The appellants were merchants in Philadelphia in the retail 
sale of clothing and furniture who due to a Pennsylvania statute were prohibited from 
sale of these items on Sundays. All were members of the Orthodox Jewish Faith which 
requires the closing of their businesses and total abstention from any work on Saturdays. 
They claimed that enforcement of the statute prohibited the free exercise of t,heir religion 
because the regulation restricting their business from operating Sundays forced the Sab­
batarians to either suffer serious economic loss or give up their religious practice and 
work on Saturdays. Id. at 601-02. 
57. Id. at 605. 
58. Id. at 606. 
59. 450 U.S. at 723. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 723 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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unavailable for work due to their religious beliefs.62 Harlan con­
cluded that such a holding was significant in two respects. First, it 
overruled Braunfeld.63 Second, it required that the state. "single 
out," for financial assistance, those individuals whose behavior was 
based upon religious motivations while similarly denying benefits to 
those individuals whose behavior was identical, but not religiously 
motivated.64 Justice Harlan suggested that this might violate the 
state's obligation to remain neutra1.65 The state, he concluded, could 
not be "constitutionally compelled to carve out an exception" in this 
case.66 "Those situations in which the Constitution may require spe­
cial treatment on account of. religion . . . are far and few 
between...."67 
Thus, Justice Rehnquist agreed with Justice Harlan's dissent in 
Sherbert that, although a state voluntarily could grant exemptions 
from state unemployment regulations to religious individuals, consti­
tutionally, the state could not be required to grant the exemption.68 
Following the rationale in Braunfeld and Harlan's dissent in Sher­
bert, Rehnquist maintained that the denial of unemployment com­
pensation benefits to Thomas would not discriminate against his 
religious beliefs but merely would make the practice more 
expensive.69 
Justice Rehnquist was also disturbed by the Court's assessment 
of the establishment clause.7o Even though the majority's decision 
required that the state provide direct financial assistance as a result 
of an individual's religious beliefs, the Court, while following the 
rationale of Sherbert,71 held that it was not establishing religion.72 
62. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,420 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
63. 374 U.S. at 420-21. Harlan concluded that the secular purpose of the statute in 
Sherbert was much clearer than that involved in Braun/eld, and in addition, the indirect 
financial burden on the statute was far less. Thus, any difference between Sherbert and 
Braunfeld should be to the detriment of Sherbert. Id. 
64. Id. at 422-23. See Kurland, 0/Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. 
CHI. L. REV. I, 22-26 (1961). 
65. 374 U.S. at 422-23. 
66. Id. 
67. 374 U.S. at 423. See, e.g., Baunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday 
closing laws upheld against free exercise challenge); ~:Ieveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 
14 (1946) (federal law prohibiting polygamy upheld over religious objections); Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (statute denying minors right to distribute religious 
literature upheld against free exercise challenge); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. II 
(1905) (compulsory smallpox vaccination upheld against religious objection). 
68. 450 U.S. at 723. 
69. Id. at 722. 
70. Id. at 724. 
71. 374 U.S. at 409-10. 
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Rehnquist contended that the majority's decision was inconsistent 
with prior establishment cases which required the Court to hold that 
the statute violated the establishment clause.73 Rehnquist concluded 
that the proper approach to the establishment clause was developed 
in Justice Stewart's dissent in Abbington School J)istrict v. 
Schempp.74 
In Schempp, the Court held a Pennsylvania statute that required 
reading of the Bible at the commencement of each school day un­
constitutional because it violated the establishment clause.75 Justice 
Stewart explained that the scope of the establishment clause was lim­
ited to "governmental support of proselytizing activities of religious 
sects by throwing the weight of secular authorit[ies] behind the dis­
semination of religious tenets."76 Justice Rehnquist in Thomas ex­
plained, however, that government assistance that did not induce 
religious belief, but merely accommodated religious choice, was not 
impermissible government involvement in religion and thus did not 
violate the establishment clause,?7 Consequently, had Indiana vol­
untarily chosen to award unemployment compensation benefits to 
people who left their jobs due to religious reasons, the aid would be 
constitutional "because it redounds directly to the benefit of the indi­
vidual."7s Rehnquist, therefore, maintained that the majority inter­
preted the free exercise clause too broadly and thus the opinion 
conflicted with the scope of prior establishment clause cases.79 The 
Thomas decision, therefore, exacerbates the tension between the two 
religious clauses.so 
As a result of the analysis in Thomas, the Court once again 
failed to provide a solution to the tension that exists between the free 
exercise clause and the establishment clause. The Court in Thomas 
was correct in affirming the lower court's determination that the be­
72. 450 U.S. at 719-20. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
73. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (Court maintained that the gov­
ernment cannot constitutionally pass laws which aid religions as against non-believers); 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. I, 15-16 (1947) (Court asserted that the estab­
lishment clause forbids government to support or assist any or all religions and no state 
can pass laws which aid one or all religions). 
74. 374 U.S. 203,314 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
75. Id. at 205. See also McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 248-49 
(1948) (Reed, J., dissenting). 
76. 374 U.S. at 314. 
77. 450 U.S. at 727. 
78. Id. 
79. /d. Accord Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (Court upheld dispurse­
ments of various items to parochial schools). 
80. 450 U.S. at.727. 
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liefs held by Thomas were religiousBJ and that the state's interests 
were not sufficiently compelling to outweigh the interest of protect­
ing Thomas' religious beliefs.B2 The Court, however, failed to ana­
lyze adequately the tension between the establishment clause and the 
free exercise clause. 
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, correctly condemned the ma­
jority's analysis of the establishment clause.B3 The decision in 
Thomas re-emphasized the Court's failure in Sherbert to explain suf­
ficiently the scope of the establishment clause. In addition, the 
Court failed to explain why the Indiana Supreme Court was incor­
rect in applying the rationale of Braun/eld to deny Thomas unem­
ployment compensation benefits.84 Given the contrasting opinions 
of Sherbert and Braunfeld, it is unclear whether they are reconcila­
ble.85 At least one commentator has suggested that "Sherbert was an 
aberration when it was decided; it and Braun/eld v. Brown, decided 
two years earlier, are as irreconcilable as two cases not involving the 
same parties can be."86 The question becomes whether there is an 
alternative solution to resolve the tension between the two religious 
clauses, "both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of 
which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the 
other."B7 
IV. THE NEED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS 
The definition of religion under the religious clauses has 
evolved over time. In the nineteenth century, religion was defined 
narrowly, referring strictly to theistic beliefs such as a belief in 
81. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
82. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. 
83. 450 U.S. at 724-27. Compare Braunfeld, supra notes 56-58 and accompanying 
text. Under Braunfeld, denying Thomas unemplClyment compensation benefits would 
not violate the free exercise clause because th!= state is not discriminating against Thomas 
based on his religious beliefs. Rather, the state is merely enforcing a general statute 
whose purpose and effect is to advance the state's secular goals. 
84. 366 U.S. 599 (1961). The Court's rationale was that granting exemptions to the 
Sabbatarians would be administratively cumbersome and might frustrate the state's legit­
imate goal of providing a uniform day of rest. Id. at 607-09. 
85. The United States Supreme Court did not address the legal implications of 
Braunfeld in its analysis. 
86. See 374 U.S. at 417-18. Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, suggested that 
in light of Sherbert, Braunfeld "was wrongly decided and should be overruled." Id. at 
418 (Stewart, J., concurring). Compare Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in 
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1322 (1970). 
87. See Ely, supra note 84 at 1322. 
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"God."88 Today however, the scope of the definition of religion has 
changed dramatically,89 not only from a public perspective but also 
from the Court's understanding of religion.90 It is not clear from the 
majority's opinion in Thomas whether the Court has retreated in de­
fining the scope of the establishment clause or has extended the lib­
erties of the free exercise clause. It is apparent, however, that the 
Thomas Court's reliance on Sherbert in defining the scope of the 
establishment clause91 raises the question of whether the Thomas 
Court's interpretation violates the first amendment. Since Sherbert, 
the Court has strongly suggested that an exemption granted solely to 
religious persons is unconstitutional.92 This appraisal was conclu­
sively indicated by the Court's construction of the draft law's consci­
entious objector provisions in United States v. Seeger 93 and Welsh v. 
United States .94 
In Seeger, the defendant was convicted in the District Court of 
the Southern District of New York for having refused induction into 
the armed forces despite the claim that he was exempt from service 
under section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service 
Act95 because he was conscientiously opposed to war as a result of 
his "religious" beliefs.96 The court of appeals, however, reversed97 
88. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970). 
89. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342-44 (1980) (holding that with respect to 
"common sense of mankind" polygamy is not a religious tenet); Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145, 164-68 (1878) (holding that the Mormon practice of polygamy was 
not protected by the religious clauses of the first amendment); see also Giannella, supra 
note 5, at 1386-88. 
90. See TRIBE, supra note I, at 826. 
91. See Welch v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (conscientious objector's defi­
nition of religious belief not limited to orthodox or parochial religious beliefs); United 
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (court cannot require that the religious beliefs of 
conscientious objector be comprehensible or traditionally held religious doctrines); Tor­
caso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (nontheistic religions protected by first amendment); 
Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953) (unorthodox or informal religious beliefs 
must receive first amendment protection); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) 
(free exercise clause prohibits court from inquiring into truth or veracity of one's reli­
gious beliefs). 
92. 450 U.S. at 719-20. The Court has determined that "neither a state nor the 
Federal Government ... can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which 
aid all religions as against nonbelievers ...." Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 
(1961). 
93. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. 
94. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
95. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
96. 380 U.S. at 164-65. Section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service 
Act states: 
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to 
be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United 
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and the United States Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's 
decision.98 
The statute was challenged on two grounds: first, section 6( j) 
did not exempt non-religious conscientious objectors; and second, 
section 6( j) discriminated between different forms of religion be­
cause religion was defined as only those beliefs that were "in a rela­
tion to a Supreme Being."99 In determining whether Seeger's beliefs 
were subject to first amendment protection under the statute, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the test of whether a belief was" 'in a 
relation to a Supreme Being' is whether a given belief that is sincere 
and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to 
that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies 
for the exemption."loo The courts, therefore, may not reject the be­
liefs because they find them incomprehensible: rather, their duty lies 
in deciding whether the beliefs asserted by the claimant are sincerely 
held \0 1 and whether they represent a religious belief. \02 
A few years later in Welsh, the Court extended the scope of be­
liefs which fall within the definition of religion under section 6(j) of 
the Universal Military Training and Service Act. \03 In Welsh, the 
claimant was convicted for having refused induction into the armed 
States who, by reason of religious training and beliefs, is conscientiously op­
posed to participation in war in any form. Religious training and belief in this 
connection means an individuals's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being in­
volving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not 
include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely 
personal moral code. 
Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 759, 62 Stat. 604,612-13, (1948) (current ver­
sion at 50 u.s.c. app. § 456(j) (1976». For the purpose of this article, the discussion will 
be limited to case No. 50 of the 3 cases brought before the United States Supreme Court 
in this cause of action. 380 U.S. at 166. 
97. 380 U.S. at 166. 
98. United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 855 (1964). 
99. 380 U.S. at 166. 
100. Id. at 165. See supra note 94. 
101. 380 U.S. at 165-66. The Court concluded that "[t]his construction avoids im­
puting to Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs, exempting some and 
excluding others, and is in accord with the well-established congressional policy of equal 
treatment for those whose opposition to service is grounded in their religious tenets." Id. 
at 176. 
102. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 81 (1944). The Court in Ballard 
upheld a conviction in the district court of mail fraud for distribution of religious litera­
ture and solicitation of funds accomplished through false and fraudulent representations 
because the defendant's beliefs were not honestly and sincerely held out as religious be­
liefs. Id. at 79, 82, 88. 
103. 380 U.S. at 184-85. The Court quoted Justice Douglas in Ballard, where he 
stated: "Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of 
their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some 
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forces. I04 Although the Court of Appeals affirmed,105 the United 
States Supreme Court reversed because of the decision's fundamen­
tal inconsistency with Seeger. 106 The Court held that under the See­
ger rationale, in order for a registrant's conscientious objection to 
war to be classified as religious pursuant to section 6(j), the claim­
ant's opposition to war must stem from "the registrant's moral, ethi­
cal, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong and that these 
beliefs be held with the strength of traditional religious 
convictions." 107 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan reluctantly affirmed the 
Court's opinion on constitutional grounds; however, he objected to 
the Court's statutory construction and raised many questions con­
cerning this expanded interpretation of religion under section 
6( j). 108 Harlan maintained that two options existed: first, Congress 
could eliminate all exemptions and thus create a "neutral" course of 
action which would not violate the free exercise clause; 109 or second, 
once the Court had chosen to exempt, it could not "draw the line 
between theistic and non-theistic religious beliefs on the one hand 
may be incomprehensible to others." ld. at 184 (quoting United States v. Ballard, 322 
U.S. 78, 86 (1944». 
104. 398 U.S. 342-44. 
105. ld. at 335 (Welsh was convicted for failing to comply with section 6(j) of the 
Universal Military and Training Service Act). See supra note 94. 
106. Welch v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1978). The court of appeals 
affirmed the district judge's declaration, finding no religious basis for the claim. The 
court held that while the petitioner's "beliefs are held with the strength of more tradi­
tional religious convictions," these beliefs did not fall within the parameters of "religion" 
as defined in section 6(j). ld. at 1081 (construing Universal Military Training and Ser­
vice Act, § 6(j), 50 U.S.c. App. § 456(j) (1976». 
107. 398 U.S. at 335. Welsh claimed that 6(j) exempted him from service because 
"I am by reason of my religious training and belief, conscientiously opposed to participa­
tion in war in any form." ld. at 336-37. 
108. ld. at 339-40. The court further added that, 
[m]ost of the great religions of today and of the past have embodied the idea of 
a Supreme Being or a Supreme Reality-a God-who communicates to man in 
some way a consciousness of what is right and should be done, of what is wrong 
and therefore should be shunned. If an individual deeply and sincerely holds 
beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and content but that neverthe­
less impose upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any 
war at any time, those beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that individual "a 
place parallel to that filled by. . . God" in traditionally religious persons. Be­
cause his beliefs function as a religion in his life, such an individual is as much 
entitled to a "religious" conscientious objector exemption under § 6( j) as is 
someone who derives his conscientious opposition to war from traditional reli­
gious convictions. 
ld. at 340. 
109. ld. at 344-45. 
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and secular beliefs on the other.""o Harlan concluded that any such 
distinction violated the establishment clause. III 
It is readily apparent that the narrow scope of beliefs histori­
cally receiving religious protection under the first amendment 112 has 
evolved to include a broader range of beliefs granted protection by 
the religious clauses."3 The Court's decisions in Seeger and Welsh 
indicate an apparent move toward broadening the scope of relig­
iously protected activities. Although the Court's definition of reli­
gion in Seeger and Welsh is a statutory interpretation of "religious 
training and belief' as understood in section 6( j), it may suggest that 
the Court's ultimate definition of religion for constitutional pur­
poses I 14 is to provide constitutional protection to beliefs of an indi­
vidual which are sincerely held moral and philosophical beliefs. 115 
The Court has stressed that it is not for the Court to decide the truth 
or falsity of a claimant's religious beliefs, but to inquire only into the 
sincerity of the claimant's beliefs. I 16 
It is evident that in Seeger and Welsh, the Court extended the 
definition of beliefs falling within the definition of "religion" to 
avoid declaring the statute unconstitutional for violating the estab­
lishment clause. 117 In both decisions, the Court appeared to be mov­
ing toward abolishing the requirement that beliefs must be religious 
to be afforded first amendment protection under a harmonious read­
ing of the religious clauses. Under this approach, the Court may 
provide benefits to a person holding a particular belief, while not 
defining the belief as religious, in order to uphold the individual's 
110. Id. at 356. See 374 U.S. at 418 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Cf. McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing laws based on State's desire for uniform 
day of rest held not violative of establishment clause because choosing another day 
would violate the concept of neutrality toward religion); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 
(1890) (Mormon's challenge that statute prohibiting polygamy violated their right to free 
exercise of religion upheld because polygamy illegal for all, not just Mormon faith). See 
also Kurland, supra note 62, at 22-23. 
Ill. 398 U.S. at 356. 
112. Id. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., separate 
opinion); School District of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, 
J., concurring). 
113. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
114. Id. 
liS. See MANSFIELD, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION, RELIGION AND PUBLIC ORDER, 
8-9 n.I04 (1965); See also Gianella, supra note 5, at 1425. 
116. 398 U.S. at 339-40. 
117. 322 U.S. at 86-93. In Welsh, Justice Harlan in a concurring opinion stated 
that it is "the intensity of moral conviction with which a belief is held" that must be 
analyzed to determine whether the belief falls within the definition of religion under 
section 6(j)." 398 U.S. at 358 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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first amendment rights. Moreover, this would not violate the estab­
lishment clause because it would not promote one form of religion 
over another. Thus, to avoid violating the establishment clause, a 
court could extend the analysis of religion as developed in Seeger 
and Welsh. Therefore, to ease the tension between the free exercise 
clause- and establishment clause, the Court should omit the "reli­
gious" belief requirement altogether and afford protection to all 
moral and philosophical beliefs that are sincerely held. 
Given the foregoing analysis, the question becomes what effect 
the decision in Thomas will have on the Court's understanding of 
"religion," especially in light of Seeger and Welsh. Thomas clearly 
has not resolved the "tension" between the two religious clauses. By 
awarding Thomas unemployment compensation benefits because of 
his conscientious objection to producing armament, the Court, in ef­
fect, provided benefits to one with religious beliefs while similarly 
denying these benefits to those with equally strong morally held con­
victions. Under Seeger and Welsh, this violates the establishment 
clause. If the Court, however, were to extend benefits to individuals 
who concientiously objected to all war on the basis of moral or phil­
osophical reasons, then extending benefits to an individual such as 
Thomas, based on his "religious" convictions, would not violate the 
establishment clause. Should the Court adopt this form of analysis 
in cases of conscientious objectors, the tension between the religious 
clauses might be reduced. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The two religious clauses of the first amendment have long been 
a source of interest and controversy. With the expansion of those 
beliefs requiring protection under the religious clauses, a tension has 
evolved between the two clauses. With the application of the first 
amendment to the states through the fourteenth amendment, the 
struggle between the clauses has escalated. 
In Thomas v. Review Board, the United States Supreme Court 
was faced again with the question of how to reconcile the right of 
freedom of religious expression and the requirement that the state 
not establish religion. The Court, unfortunately, failed to analyze 
appropriately the problem. As a result, it initiated a policy that, in 
effect, establishes religion. The Court must seek a solution to this 
ongoing controversy because if extended to its logical extreme, each 
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clause will clash with the other. I 18 
The Court in Welsh extended the scope of activities entitled to 
religious protection under the first amendment to "include those be­
liefs held out in opposition to war which stem from the registrant's 
moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right or wrong and 
that these beliefs be held with the strength of traditional religious 
convictions."1l9 The Court in Thomas could have extended this 
analysis and removed altogether the requirement that one's beliefs 
stem from religious faith in order for an individual to receive the 
status of a conscientious objector, and thus be exempt from the un­
employment requirements of the Indiana statute. Rather, the Court 
should look strictly to the sincerity with which the individual holds 
his beliefs. The sincerity requirement is identical to that previously 
used by the Court in analyzing religious claims. Therefore, an adop­
tion by the Court of the sincerity test is not only a logical extension 
of prior case law, but is also a feasible solution which will aid in 
relieving the tension between the free exercise clause and the estab­
lishment clause. 
Mark.D. Vasington 
118. See Ely supra note 84, at 1322. 
119. 398 U.S. at 335. 
